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ABSTRACT 
Generally speaking, the stimuli to various types of tech­
nological change are associated with two types of anticipated feedback: 
hidden hand feedback (the possibility of making higher profits) and 
hidden foot feedback (the possibility of being dislodged from 
a successful market by the process of creative destruction). In 
this paper it is argued that the most significant gains in produc-
tivity result from hidden foot rather than hidden hand feedback. 
Moreover, it is also argued that the disappearance of such feedback 
has not only contributed to the productivity slowdown, but also to 
providing the economy �1th a very unique kind of inflationary bias 
in which inflationary pressures are likely to reach their maximum 
strength when the economy is headed into a downturn. Finally, 
various measures .. to restore the dynamic stability of the economy are 
considered. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK IN A 
DYNAMICALLY STABLE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
Burton H. Klein 
California Institute of Technology 
No one can deny that the U.S. economy is becoming more 
predictable than it once was--more predictable in the sense that it 
is no longer generating the technological surprises it did during 
the first half of this century. But at the same time it has 
become a more unstable economy: in order to deal with double digit 
inflation, much more serious downturns are required in order to 
dampen the rate of inflation. 
How can an economy become simultaneously more predictable 
and less stable? It is commonly believed that a stable economic 
system must be as predictable as the planets. That stability and 
predictability go hand in hand, we are told, is no more tha.n col!DD.on 
sense. But is it coJ1DD.on sense? In the chc.-nges it made in its 
product line, Chrysler was certainly a far more predictable company 
after World War II than it was during the 20's and 30's. Yet, at 
the same ti.me that Chrysler became a more predictable system it 
became a more unstable system. In the 30's it was taking business 
away from Ford and General Motors, but now it is asking the govern-
ment for a loan. 
Or to consider an even larger economic system--in displaying 
the lowest rate of productivity growth for more than one hundred years 
the British economy has been the most predictable of all the 
industrialized countries. But from the point of view of being 
able to weather the current economic storm, it is in much the 
same position as Chrysler. 
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It is true, of course, that in an imaginary, unchanging 
world economies can be predictable both in the small and in the large: 
that is, they can survive simply by taking the classical law of 
supply and demand as a given. However, if an economic system is 
to make smooth adjustments in dealing with new circumstances--if 
it is to remain predictable in the large, so to speak--it must 
be able to adapt itself to new circumstances. In fact, what I 
mean by "dynamic" is the ability of a person, a firm or an economy 
to·adapt itself to new circumstances by generating
-
new alternativ�s. 
But, it should be apparent that if predictability in the small 
is defined as "microstability" and predictability in the large as 
"macrostability" neither an individual firm nor an entire economy 
can simultaneously conserve its micro and macrostability. Only in 
heaven can microstability be equated to macrostability. Here on 
earth, the greater the insistence on microstability--the ·:greater 
the insistence on preserving a way of life--the lower will be its 
macrostability. Conversely, if a system is to enjoy a high degree 
of macrostability it must enjoy the ability to generate new alter­
natives, when confronted by necessity. In other words, whereas 
microstability is a static concept of stability, macrostability is 
a dynamic concept. 
It is important to recognize, however, that the difference 
between micro and macrostability is a matter of degree rather than 
of kind. Inasmuch as some departments are more bureaucratically 
rigid than others, with lawyers and accountants playing larger 
roles, no firm enjoys 100 percent macrostability. And inasmuch 
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as some industries exhibit a smaller ability to adapt to new 
circumstances than others, no economy enjoys 100 percent 
macrostability. Conversely, even the British economy cannot be 
described as an economy with 100 percent microstability: if it had 
a zero capability to deal with new circumstances, it would have 
collapsed long ago. And though the U.S. economy is now a less 
dynamic economic system than it was twenty years ago, as compared 
with Britain it still enjoys a relatively high degree of macro­
stability. For example, except during the Great Depression and 
World War II, British working class people have steadfastly 
refused to move in order to take better paying jobs. And though 
we are rapidly catching up--more than 4/5 of British firms are 
managed by lawyers and accountants. Nevertheless, if the following 
argument is correct, both the productivity decline and the development 
of an economy highly sensitive to inflationary and deflationary 
shocks can be understood only in terms of an economy which by 
featuring microstability more and more is losing its macrostability. 
I. 
What, the�- determines whether economies will have a 
relatively high or a relatively low degree of macrostability� 
To consider this key question, it will be useful to ref er to 
the familiar S-shaped curve relating the performance of a tech­
nology to time (Chart I). How is the performance of a technology 
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CHART I
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to be measured? Ideally, we would like to have a single measure 
that took into account both reductions in costs and improvements 
in quality . However, since it is practically impossible to devise 
such a measure, we must choose b etween a cos t or a quality measure, 
depending upon which will provide the most accurate estimates. 
If the performance of a technology is appropriately 
measured then the typical picture is as shown�-one in which a 
period of fast history is followed by a period of slow history . 
The dashed lines represent discoveries such as the Model T Ford 
or the planar transistor--wbich when viewed as isolated events 
were quite unpredictable . On the basis of my definition of 
"dynamic," both fast and slow history are to be regarded as dynamic 
processes : both involve adapting to new circumstances by dis-
covering new alternatives . The essential difference is that 
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inasmuch as fast his tory involves dealing with new circumstances at a 
rapid rate of improvement, it requires a higher degree of macrostability . 
Why then, does fast history sooner or later turn into 
slow history? According to conventional wisdom, after the promising 
ideas for making non-incremental advances have been exhausted , 
entrepreneurs have no alternative but to turn to bringing about 
incremental advances . However, I do not suscribe to this line 
of reasoning. In the first place,. how soon a technology runs 
into diminishing returns depends on how broadly or narrowly it 
is defined; and it is man and not nature who determines how 
broadly it is defined. For example, if computer technology had 
been defined to exclude the possib ility of s emi-conductors , 
today we would be witnessing slow history in computer technology . 
In the second place , if ideas represented the main shortage , then 
when revitalizing discoveries were made--discoveries such as the 
Bessemer process in steel or the jet engine--then we would expect 
that major f irms in the industry would account for their share 
of such discoveries . But of f ifty cases I have looked into , in 
not one did a major firm in the industry bring about a revitalizing 
discovery . They were made by firms in another industry, by new 
firms in the industry in question , or occasionally by university 
laboratories; but never by major firms in an industry featuring 
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slow history. Finally , when challenged by newer technologies , other 
technologies have shown impressive gains in the rate of improvement; 
railroads and cotton textiles ,  for example. 
The principal reason why technologies come to be defined 
very narrowly and why the rate of progress eventually slows down 
is not because of a shortage of ideas , but rather because of a 
shortage of hidden-foot feedback . Hidden-foot feedback is the 
feedback a firm obtains from its rivals; and it is measured in 
terms of changes in market shares . Industries with little or no 
rivalry , according to this measure , are industries in which f irms 
by developing products which are only trivially different from 
each other , impose no risk upon each other . But inasmuch as 
what is a technological risk to one firm in an industry , is a 
competitive risk to another, the more technological risk-taking 
that is undertaken in developing products with nontrivial dif ferences , 
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the greater will be the changes in the market shares and the more 
effective the hidden foot. Ane when 40 percent of a well established 
market can be lost al.most overnight ,  firms cannot afford to wait 
for a crisis . They must do their long-range crisis prevention 
planning every Monday morning . 
In principal ,  of course, all firms in an industry 
might aim for equally ambitious advances--and all might be equally 
successful , or equally unsuccessful--with market shares remaining 
more or less the same . But, s tatis tically speaking , the probability 
of such an occurrence is something like one in a million. 
Almost invariably ,  the larger the advances that are sought , the 
wider will be the differences between more and less successful 
R & D projects , and the larger will be the change in market shares. 
Why does the push of the hidden foot play a much more 
important role in a dynamic economy than the pull of the hidden 
hand , that is , the pull of profits ? If the gains from making large 
advances could be accurately predicted (if the hidden hand played 
the highly predictable role it is alleged to play in the economic 
textbooks) no hidden foot would be required . The firm would only 
hcve to decide whether the possibility of a greater profit warranted 
a greater risk. However, in the real world luck plays such an 
important role in major advances that reliable predictions of profits 
involved in major technological opportunities simply cannot be 
made. What is as predictable as death and taxes in an industry 
with large changes in market shares is that if one firm is not 
successful, another will b e .  Hence, i f  firms hop� t o  survive in 
such a dynamic industry they must either b e  willing to take risks 
when they cannot calculate the odds of b eing successful, or face 
the more certain risk of b eing driven out of business • .And it is 
for this reason that the push of the hidden foot is the main 
driving force of dynamic capitalism. 
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What is most important, if such firms are to put the odds 
on their side, is to ask themselves searching questions about their 
technological opportunities, and tough questions about the need to 
revamp their organizations in order to exploit these opportunities 
(i.e. the entrepreneurial function) . ¥�reover, this question-raising 
function has a major influence on the internal characteristics of 
organizations . In such organizations there is likely to be a good 
deal of feedback in the form of pecuniary and nonpecuniary for 
individual creative accomplishments .  Generally speaking, salaries 
in such organizations are based on creative accomplishments; and are 
not highly correlated with either age or administrative position. 
In turn, such a reward s tructure drives organizations to b e  highly 
interactive both internally and with their customers and with 
universities--so interactive the authorship of particular discoveries 
is always in dispute . Consequently, necessity in the form of the 
hidden foot makes for highly interactive questioning organizations, 
and in doing so, makes such organizations much more likely to be 
favored by chance. 
In short, my explanation of fast history is a s tatistical 
explanation; necessity, in the form of the hidden foot, makes for 
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entrepreneurs who ask burning questions, and to search for answers to 
these questions, highly interactive organizations . This activity, in 
turn, results in a lot of luck, both good and bad. But inasmuch as only 
the good luck gets recorded, fast history is made to seem so smooth, 
it seems to have been preordained . Thus, to explain rapid economic 
progress we need a model which is neither completely deterministic 
(b ecause it fails to recognize the entreprenurial question-raising 
activity and the associate d role of luck) nor completely stochastic 
(b ecause in failing to perceive that man's destiny is not entirely 
determined by God's throwing dice is simply another brand of deter­
minism) --but, rather, which acknowledges a reciprocal relationship 
b etween necessity and luck. 
The principal factor in determining whether or not an 
industry will generate relatively much or little feedback is the 
ability of new firms to enter the industry . If they hope to become 
a major factor in the industry, new firms obviously have an incentive 
to ask themselves tough and searching questions . .And in doing so, 
they not only contribute to making more than their share of new 
dis coveries--they prevent existing firms from resting upon the 
basis of their previous accomplishments .  
However, during the evolution of a technology, both 
scale economies and various types of vertical integration become 
much more important--and with the consequence that the cost of 
entering the industry increases by one or two orders of magnitude. 
This is the essential reason why the rate of entry almost always 
slows down--and the e�sential reason why fast history is sooner 
or later superceded by slow history, when b ecause of the relative 
absence of hidden-foot feedback, chance plays a smaller role. 
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Why does a trend towards microstability--as measured 
in terms of a larger and larger proportion of slow history 
industries--jeopardize a country's long term macrostability, 
as measured by it's rate of productivity gain? If it costs only 
one twentieth as much to bring about an incremental advance as 
a discontinuous advance, and if twenty small steP.s brought as 
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much progress as one large one, then slow history would not b e  
expensive history, and the rate of productivity gain need not 
decline . However, the truth of the matter is that making a singl� 
small s tep is likely to cost as much as, or more than, making 
a large one, which means progress via the slow history route is 
likely to be something like twenty times as expensive. 
What makes incremental progress so slow and expensive is 
that not pressed to ask searching questions, highly specialized 
organizations only search where the veins of ore are very thin. 
Moreover, microstability becomes a way of life. Instead of 
accepting personal responsibility, people impose on themselves 
all sorts of rules and regulations, so, if anything does go wrong 
no one can b e  blamed; and the degree of internal bureaucracy 
is further enhanced by the formation of tight internal alliances 
dedicated to the preservation of the status quo . From the point 
of view of an insider who, at best, can have only a marginal impact 
on his org:mization, acting to conserve his power while putting on 
a great show of looking busy is eminently rational behavior. And 
it is this kind of bureaucratic environment that makes incremental 
progress so slow and expensive. 
Many economis,ts seem to assume that b ecause private 
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firms ob ey the discipline of the marketplace and public organizations 
do not, the difference b etween them is the difference b etween day 
and night . This, however, is simply not true. If bureaucratic 
b ehavior is defined as highly predictable b ehavior that makes 
organizations highly insensitive to feedback, then we can expect to 
observe an entire spectrum of private firms from highly adaptive 
to highly bureaucratic; and in industries with little or no 
rivalry there is no real difference b etween public and private 
organizations . For example, in the degree of bureaucratic 
behavior they display, banks, public utility companies, and steel 
companies are not very different from the Defense Department, the 
Post Office Department, or the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Although the EPA ic not abcolutely unique in its deg=ec 
of bureaucratic ( i . e .  predictable) behavior, because of its impact 
on the dynamic stability of the country it does deserve special mention; 
that is, it has not only contributed to a slowdown in productivity 
gains not only as customarily measured, but also, to making progress in 
lowering the rate of environmental degradation much lower than it 
otherwise might be. The essential reason goes back to the Congress 
which seemed to feel that cleaning up the environment was 
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like a supposedly one-time task of cleaning up a dirty room. 
And the authors of the Clean Air Act assumed that by hiring 
droves of lawyers to oversee that task, they could, in effect, repeal 
the second law of thermodynamics .  Unfortunately, however, new things 
are b eing learned almost daily about how to increase the rate of 
productivity as it applies to lessening the rate of environmental 
degradation . But b ecause the EPA bureaucracy is almost totally 
incapable of dealing with new circumstances, progress is b oth 
terribly slow and terribly expensive .  
T o  summarize: There is a longer-term tradeoff between 
the degree of hidden-foot feedback and the cost of making progress . 
This is the tradeoff shown in Chart II . When the entry of new 
firms creates a good deal of hidden foot feedback, the cost of 
progress will be relatively small .  On the other hand, when 
b ecause of a shortage of such feedback, organizations impose a 
high degree of bureaucracy upon themselves, the cost of progress 
is likely to be very large. It should be apparent, therefore, 
that a decline in feedback and an increase in private and public 
bureaucratic behavior threatens the longer-tern stability of the 
economy by making the role of productivity gain smaller than it other-
¥iSe would b e .  And the essential reason that the long-term rate of 
productivity gain in the U. S. is falling is that we 're being 
driven up to the top portion of this discontinuouc curve . 
III . 
A serious decline in feedback not only jeopardizes the 
long-term economic stability of an economy, it also jeopardizes 
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short-term s tability .  In particular , it makes for an economy in 
which larger and larger recessions are required to restrain the 
rate of inflation. Leaving the inflation issue aside for a moment , 
I want to point out firs t ,  that an economy in which a s ignificant 
number of industries are generating a large amount of feedback 
helps to minimize the amplitude of business cycles b ecause those 
industries that generate a good deal of feedback are likely to 
suffer less from economic downturns than industries that do 
not . 
To test this and another hypothesis , over the summer I was 
engaged in a statistical performance of some 500 manufacturing 
industries . The s tudy was _based upon unpublished data for these 
industries supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics . The data 
base included information on output , productivity , prices , unit labor 
costs , and wage rates; and covered the period 1958 to 1976 . 
In order to analyze the data , we divided industries into three 
groups based upon the performance in bringing about productivity 
gains during the first half of that period . The high performance 
group was defined as those industries whose average rate of 
productivity gain during the first half of the period was more 
than one standard deviation above the average , and included 
industries such as semi-conductors , computers , man-made fibers, 
pharmaceutical preparations , fertilizers , radio and TV sets , 
household refrigerators , and malt beverages : industries 
characterized by a relatively high degree of rivalry . The low 
performance group was comprised of industries whose productivity 
gains were one deviation b elow the average; and it included 
industries such as frozen fruits , men's and boys ' suits and 
clothing , newspapers , b ooks , metal cans and primary lead: 
industries characterized by very little rivalry . 
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As Chart III shows , until the 1973-1974 downturn, recessions 
in the high performance group of indus tries were almos t  entirely 
recessions in their rate of growth . There are two reasons why , 
by b eing less subject to downturns , such industries contributed 
to the overall stability of the economy . Firs t ,  firms who have 
to deal with a large amount of feedback more or less continuously, 
and who experience sharp downturns even when the economy is highly 
prosperous , are better able to deal with recessions. Second , by 
virtue of having an advantage over less dynamic firms in being 
able to recognize a potential unsatisfied demand for new products, 
such firms tend to be involved in activities that are less subject 
to downturns . For both of these reasons , the regions of the 
country less affected by serious downturns are those possessing 
industries characterized by a relatively high degree of macrostability; 
for example, California during the Great Depression . 
However , as Chart III shows , during the 1973-1974 
downturn , the high performance industries experienced a very 
significant decline in output; in fact , a decline quite as serious 
as in the medium and low productivity industries. And their 
productivity performance b egan to display a more cyclical pattern . 
Indeed, in being highly associated with the business cycle , their 
productivity performance b egan to resemble that of the medium and 
low performance groups . 
As Chart IV shows , in manufacturing industries as a 
whole, the rate of productivity increase tends to slow down during 
economic recoveries, in anticipation of a general decline in out-
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put; and to increase during recessions; in anticipation of an up­
turn in the level of output . Thus, the 1958 , the 1970, and the 
1973 downturns were preceded by periods in which the trend of 
productivity gain was generally downward. Moreover it should 
be noted that this pattern of behavior is not peculiar to the Post 
World War II periods. Since 189 0 ,  movements in productivity in 
manufacturing as a whole have been highly associated with the 
business cycle--and in three out of four cycles , movements in 
productivity have provided good lead indicators of both downturns 
and upturns. 
How is this to be explained? It is 
'
true, of course , 
that capacity constraints become more and more important during 
an upturn, and that to further expand the labor force , it is 
necessary to draw upon marginal workers. It is also true that 
once the downturn starts , there is a tendency not to reduce 
employment as rapidly as output declines . However , such an 
argument cannot explain why the rate of productivity increase 
(as distinct from the absolute level of productivity) rises 
above zero during upturns , thereby providing the economy with a 
higher absolute level of productivity that it had before. 
As Chart IV shows , only in the 1973-1974 downturn did the rate 
of productivity gain go below zero--and in general the most 
impress ive advances in the rate occur while coming out of 
recessions. 
My explanation of such behavior is simply this: In 
industries in which the hidden foot plays a relatively modest 
role, negative feedback in the form of lower profits occurs 
mainly during recessions. Therefore, It can be predicted that 
their search for ways to improve productivity will be widest 
when negative feedback is maximized and narrowest when it is 
minimized. 
Thus even leaving the question of inflation aside , 
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it should be apparent that a decline in feedback will j eopardize 
the short-run stability of the economy. The less firms come to 
depend upon each other for their negative feedback , and the more 
they come to depend on economic downturns the greater will be the 
economic downturns. 
IV. 
Finally , I want to show how an economic system obsessed 
by the desire for microstability tends to generate a maximum rate 
of inflation while we are heading into a recession, thereby greatly 
complicating the task of controlling inflation. This tendency 
was most strikingly exhibited during the downswing which began 
in 1973 , and ended in 1975,  when the rate of inflation in manufac­
turing increased from about 3 percent annually to over 11 percent 
annually ( Chart V). True, something like one-third of the overall 
increase in prices can be attributed to the increased cost of oil 
inputs but after taking OPEC actions into account we are still 
left with the conclusion that in manufacturing the rate of 
inflation more than doubled during the downturn, and abated only 
�fter recovery was well underway. Moreover , it should be noted 
that this sort of price behavior is not new .  During the 
recession beginning during the late 1960s the rate of inflation 
in manufacturing doubled. In fact , during each maj or downturn 
since World War II, prices behaved less flexibly than in the last . 
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Ho� is this price behavior to be explained? In the first 
place, as I have already pointed out , there is a tendency for the 
rate of productivity advance to b egin declining b efore output has 
reached its peak, and to continue to decline during the downturn. 
Closely associated with this tendency for unit labor 
costs to increase during downturns (curve labelled+) . Unit labor 
costs are defined as the average costs of producing a particular 
volume of output; and in manufacturing they account for roughly 
75 percent of all costs . Now, unit labor costs reflect changes 
in wage rates as well as changes in productivity. If productivity 
rises more rapidly than wage rates , unit labor costs will decline; 
if hourly wage rates rise more rapidly than productivity they will 
increase.  Nevertheless , the cyclical swings in productivity have 
been so large that their influence upon unit wage costs has b een 
the dominant influence . This is indicated by Chart VI, which shows 
th e relationship b etween changes in productivity and changes in unit 
wage costs. For those of you not familiar with this type of diagram, 
I want to point out that it is cons tructed simply by counting the 
numb er of observations in each cell and by making the heights of the 
contours proportional to them . Its main advantage over the familiar 
scatter diagram is that it b etter permits us to see the changes 
which have occurred in a distribution b etween two time periods . 
In this particular case,  the global correlation coefficient , R2 , 
remained about the same in both periods; and the principal change 
was an extension of observations along the correlation line; 
that is, relatively high negative productivity rates b ecame 
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CHART VI 
PRODUCTIVITY VS UNIT LABOR COST 
o" 
�,...,..§' • 
. ,ti-� 
,t- .
�.pl'. 
. ,,,(. < ... 
.. ...... 
• 
CLATER YEARS. 61-76> 
R..L tl!NLFACTLIUNG JNDJST�lES
• 
o" 
�, .... .:P" • 
�� 
;t- ..
t((.#'. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
• 
C EARLY YEARS • 58-61 > 
,,,:P ,. ... 
.. 
'f.� .. � 
i � �· I\ 
'-47 
'� .. "l9re'
• ''"1r;-
• 
� 
C>.7s 
� 
..... . 
Cl.C's 
� ..... 
'· 
.. 
- - - - > R•A= 0.795 
�� 
• 
.. 
• • 
...... ,. �e"', , �:'> . ,,, l"I( . 
. .,,,
.. 
��� 
• • 
•• 
a.�< � 
'·s� 
A•!':: 0 .e�3 
associated with very large increases in unit wage costs--and very 
large productivity rates b ecame associated with small increases 
in unit costs. 
In short, the picture is almost the direct antitheses-
of the conventional wisdom in economics . According to most of 
the macro models , steady advances in productivity occur routinely--
and increase in wages during periods of high employment lead to 
higher prices. However, as I already have pointed out, during 
the last two downturns , the maximum rate of inflation occurred 
not when unemployment was relatively low--but , rather , when it 
was relatively high. And b ecause cost-of-living allowances have 
played an increasingly important role in wage contracts ,  wage 
rates too have b ecome relatively insensitive to the rate of 
unemployment. Thus , during the past two recessions , there was no 
significant reduction in the rate of increase .  
At the same time as movements in prices have b ecome less 
and less sens itive to general business conditions , they have 
b ecome increasingly sensitive to costs. As Chart VII shows , 
from the period 1958-1967 to the period 1956-1976, the coefficient 
of correlation (r2) b etween unit wage costs and prices moved 
up from .3 to .5 , with very large increases in unit costs tending 
to be associated with large increases in prices . Moreover , after 
adjusting for increases in the cost of o il inputs , the coefficient 
of correlation during the latter period is almost . 65 . 
We all know that if business f irms are to survive in 
the longer-run, prices must cover costs. But apparently business 
firms would like, if they could, to set prices in a manner to 
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CHART VII 
MEAN TIME RATE CORRELATION OF PRICES 
VERSUS UNIT LABOR COST 
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balance their budgets at each point during the business cycle. 
Just as R & D projects are managed in a way to insure a high 
degree of predictability in the short-run , so are prices. And 
b oth reveal an economy posessed with a quest for microstability. 
The increasing insensitivity of wages and prices to 
economic downturns is , of course ,  but another indication of the 
development of highly bureaucratic business firms and labor unions. 
In industries featuring a good deal of rivalry, there are typically 
large differences in profit rates , and for fear of putting less 
profitable firms out of business union leaders in such industries 
have b een very statesmanlike in their wage demands . Consequently, 
during the period 1958 to 1967 , wages in the high productivity 
industries increased by no more than wages in the medium and 
low productivity industries. And when wage and price escalation 
started in the late 1960's , it was industries like steel that led 
the way. It can be agreed, of course ,  that were it not for the 
large increase in public expenditures during the late 1960 s ,  the 
inflation might not have started . But it also must be agreed that 
an economy in which highly bureaucratic business f irms and 
labor unions thrive b ecause of a shortage of feedback is an 
economy highly vulnerable to inflationary shocks. 
Moreover , once inflation has b egun , such price and wage 
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behavior makes for deeper recessions , becaus e much more stern action 
must b e  taken in order to throttle the rate of inflation . Indeed , 
to many economists a recess ion with 8 or 10 percent unemployment, 
needed to avo id an even bigger depression, later no longer 
seems like the unforgivable disaster it once seemed. 
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Now , it is true, o f  course , that if during periods of 
inflation all prices increased more or less equally , and if 
incomes increased at the same rate as prices , inflation need not 
make for greater downturns . But as Chart VIII shows , during the 
period 1967-76 , the variance in the rate of price increase was 
more than double what it was during the period 1958-67. With prices 
depending greatly on costs , and with large differences in cost 
increases (owing mainly to differences in productivity) such 
differences in the rate of price increase are to b e  expected. 
Moreover, although the global correlation b etween prices at output 
was close to zero during both periods , as the upper left hand 
portion of the diagram shows , in several industries above average 
growth in prices was associated with above average declines in 
output . In other words , while the slow up of supply and demand 
may b e  partially suspended during periods of inflation , it may 
not b e  entirely suspended . To be sure, the serious offender may 
not b e  penalized more greatly than more modest off enders--and the 
proportion of industries in which off enders are seriously punished 
is very small . Yet from a macro point of view the effects of such 
rpice behavior on output is , I would guess , much greater than 
would result from the closing down of Chrylser. 
Assuming that during periods of inflation there is some 
large variance in the rise of consumer prices as there is in the 
rise of manufacturing prices , what can be said about inflation from 
a consumer point of view? Quite obviously , if consumers are not 
to b e  penalized by suffering large declines in real incomes , they 
must search for bargains much more now than they did say , 10 years 
ago . In other words , even assuring that on the average many 
incomes keep up with prices , during periods of inflation , the 
consumer must deal with more uncertainty . Thus , b ecause micro 
predictability cannot be conserved in an uncertain world , the more 
that business firms try to conserve the microstab ility , the more 
uncertainty they introduce into the lives of consumers . 
v. 
In summary , if my argument is correct,  the inab ility 
of a dynamically unstable economy to deal with new circums tances 
can be revealed in several ways , including in the short-run , a 
relatively low ability to deal with inflationary shocks and 
recessions , and in the longer-run, sharp increases in the cost 
of progress and a consequent reduction in the long-term rate of 
productivity gain . 
Given the self-correcting role that feedback plays in 
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other systems , it would be surprising, indeed , if it played an almost 
zero role in the functioning of an economic system. To be sure, 
in an economic system negative feedback does not result in the 
almost automatic self-correcting mechanism as it does in cyb ernetic 
system such as steering a ship. Rather, its role is more like 
that played by feedback in b iology--for example , when confronted 
by necessity chimpanzees can be observed to invent completely 
new tools for themselves . But the fact that feedback does not play 
an almost automatic role in economic and biological systems does 
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not make it any less important. 
And it is my conviction that until this role is b etter 
understood and more widely appreciated, there is little hope for 
policy reform in this country. Indeed, unless the stabilizing role 
b ecomes to be regarded as a very natural role and unless politicians 
become something other than experts at removing feedback from an 
economic sys tem, capitalism will not survive. 
VI 
Needed Policy Reforms 
There are a number of ways to increase the degree of 
feedback in the economy . These include changes in the tax system, and 
changes in international trade policy . However, in what follows, I 
shall concentrate on measures that would increase the degree of 
risk-taking by changing the structure of industry . 
1.  Outlawing Mergers .Among Large Companies 
The conventional arguments against mergers is that they 
increase the degree of economic concentration, and that in doing so, 
they increase the concentration of po�itical power. However, this is
not my argument .  My argument is that in industries in which there is 
not already a high degree of rivalry, as measured by changes in market 
shares, mergers will result in a further reduction in risk-taking .  Thus, 
I have no doubt that the large wave of mergers which occurred during 
the last 15 years has contributed to the productivity slow down. 
Because the argument with respect to vertical integration 
is somewhat different from that for other types of mergers, I shall 
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start with vertical integration. To introduce the argument, it will 
be convenient to consider a situation in which there is already a 
high degree of rivalry--such a high degree of rivalry that every 
division of the company is compelled to s tand upon its own . In 
this hypothetical state, the engine division of General Motors is 
interested in making as much money as possible, and b ecause it is, it 
is quite as interested in selling engines to Ford as it is to General 
Motors . Similarly, the automobile assembly division wants to buy 
the b est available engine, and really does not care whether it ob tains 
it from General Motors engine division, or from some other company. 
With a high degree of rivalry and with each division of 
the company trying to make as much money as poss ible, there is, of 
course, an open question of whether we have vertical integration. 
Vertical integration as it is usually defined presupposes an effort 
to coordinate all of the inputs in terms of a single final product . 
And instead of trying to make as much money as possible, each 
division is expected to undertake its activites in a manner so as 
to best contribute to the profit position of the company as a whole.  
For example, General Motors probably would not favor development 
of engine technology that promised to make a good deal of its physical 
capital obsolete. Nor would it favor an engine program which 
provided a real threat to its administrative hierarchy and was 
therefore likely to result in huge organizational costs . 
Now, if the automobile engine companies were organized 
in separate firms, the firms engaged in assemb ling automobiles would 
probably have the same preferences . But they could not b e  nearly so 
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sure that one of another automobile firm would not adopt a superior 
engine when its survival was threatened . Moreover, should one firm 
make such an adoption, others would be forced to follow suit. Thus, 
without vertical integration, there is more uncertainty on both sides 
of the market . The buyers of progress are more uncertain b ecause 
firms whose market share is lowest have more ways to improve their 
competitive position. The sellers of technological progress are more 
uncertain b ecause from their point of view the opportunities for 
risk-taking are greater than they would be if they were parts of 
vertically integrated firms . 
In short, in indus tries with little rivalry vertical 
integration is a way to protect the firm against risks. And because 
it provides firms with relatively little ability to deal with 
uncertainty, it results in a delicate balance of power b etween firms 
who develop products which are only trivially different from each 
other . 
Hence if an economy is to continue to generate an adequate 
supply of negative feedback, mergers of large companies that result 
in a vertical integration should be outlawed; that is, unless the 
firms can supply evidence that the various suborganization in the firm 
are b eing operated quite independently . 
Next, let us consider horizontal mergers and conglomerate 
mergers. Horizontal mergers result in less risk-taking b ecause they 
result in fewer decision making centers, and hence with b etter 
opportunities for the pres ervation of a delicate balance of power. 
As far as conglomerate mergers are concerned, the main argument made 
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for them is that by diversifying its activities, the firm is better 
insured against uncertainty. But with the firm as a whole b etter 
insured agains t uncertainty, each division will have a small propensity 
to engage in risk-taking.  If the various divisions are to continue 
to raise major questions about their technological opportunities, it 
is necessary to keep the backsides of their management to the fire 
and that is j us t  whan conglomerates fail to do. 
Hence, there is a powerful economic argument against all 
mergers among large firms: it reduces the supply of hidden foot 
feedb ack . To carry the argument to the extreme: supposing that 
all firms in the U.S. were organized into one giant merger that 
was insulated against foreign competition ( e.g. , as in the Soviet 
Union) .  Under this assumption, the economy would generate absolutely 
' 
no hidden foot feedback. And it follows that the more mergers that 
are brought about, the smaller will be the supply of negative feedback. 
2. Decoupling the Generation of Electricity from Other 
Activities of Public Utility Companies 
This proposal would involve separation of generating 
electricity from transmitting and distributing electricity, while 
encouraging independent firms to compete in the generation of 
electricity on the basis of cost. While there are some outlying areas 
in which such competition should be precluded, encouraging the need 
to preserve scale economies cannot be given as a reason for not 
having such competition. In fact, public utilities commonly buy 
electricity from each other today . 
The importance of such decoupling stems from two factors . 
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The first is that the incentives of public utility companies to 
search for low-cost alternatives are probably weaker than in any 
other industry in the entire economy . Not only is there little 
or no price rivalry between utility companies, but in normal 
times, public utility rate-making procedures provide about the 
same incentives as cost-plus contracts . In times of inflation, 
the fact that regulatory commissions are loath to pass on cost 
increases holds prices down . However, public utility commiss ions 
do not provide the kind of feedback that would be provided by having 
independent companies compete on the basis of cos t .  
The second reason for the proposed decoupling i s  that, 
when it comes to developing exotic new technologies, the public 
utilities are no more capable than the railroads would have been 
to develop airplanes . 
As a consequence of poor incentives and an almost zero 
ability on the part of public utilities to engage in dynamic 
b ehavior, the country has had to pay an exhorbitant price for the 
development of nuclear energy, in terms of both cost and safety . 
Public utility companies cannot be blamed for all that has happened . 
They did not develop either the design concepts or the detailed 
designs for power plants, nor did they establish the safety regulations . 
However, the diffusion of responsibility is in part a 
reflection of the fact that the utility companies do not possess 
the required competence to play a significant role in the generation 
of new alternatives . 
Consider the very different situation in the field of 
33 
commercial aircraft development . Just as safety requirements are 
imposed on nuclear power plants by a public agency, so are safety 
requirements imposed on commercial aircraft by a public agency . 
Moreover, the aircraft companies have no less a stake in the safety 
of airliners than utility companies have in the safety of power 
plants . Yet, the aircraft companies themselves have played an 
important role in the development of safe aircraft .  For example, 
when the British Comet airplane developed serious problems, Boeing 
s ent a team to Britain to help overcome these problems . Is it 
conceivable that nuclear power companies will ever develop the 
same competence to deal with their power plant safety problems ? 
I do not mean to suggest that the United States ought 
to build more nuclear power plants . In the next decade or two, 
when it b ecomes possible to deliver solar energy into a central 
grid, or when windmills provide an important source of energy, 
their economical development will also be seriously jeopardized 
if it is entrus ted to the utility companies . 
My point is a general one: all new plants for generating 
electricity should be operated by independent companies . Utility 
companies' incentives for dis covering clever ways to cut costs 
always have been, and still are, very poor . The principal difference 
between the past and the present is that it is now more important 
to provide b etter incentives . Given this country's predicament in 
generating an adequate rate of productivity gain, the luxury of making 
power costs twice as great as they need be cannot be afforded. 
3 .  Putting a Hidden Foot in t�.e Antitrust Laws 
If this country is ever to excape from staflation, 
entrepreneurs represent an indispensable asset . But, while the 
United States possesses quite as many entrepreneurs as it ever 
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did, this s carce resource is b ecoming ensconced in a static 
equilibrium. There are, of course, a few industries in which the 
hidden foot continues to play an effective role. However the hidden 
foot function is b eing performed today mainly by foreign firms . 
An important sense the antritrust laws do contribute to 
the preservation of a dynamic economy: by preventing price fixing 
agreements, they prevent negative feedback from b eing smaller than 
it otherwise would b e .  ·However, if my argument is correct, the main 
danger this country faces is not from ouvert agreements, but from 
f irms acting in their own interests in those industries characterized 
by little or �o rivalry . In brief, my argument with respect to 
oligopoly is as follows: In an industry in which there has b een 
no entry for some years, rational b ehavior consists o f  not doing to 
your competitior what you would not like your competitor to do to 
you. In particular, firms are not likely to generate surprises 
with respect to either products or prices, because they a re so 
poorly able to deal with uncertainty that they will not want to provoke 
a conflict in which they are completely unable to engage. What they will 
do ins tead is to develop products that are only trivially different 
in commodity and price space -- b ecause by so doing, they can avoid 
unleashing a conflict that well might result in their disaster. 
Thus, the principal difference between an industry with an effective 
hidden foot and without an effective hidden foot, is that in the 
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latter case, uncertainty "space" is very narrow, and having to 
operate in such a narrow space results in imposing sharp cons traints 
upon engineers, because without such constraints the balance of 
power might be upset . 
The problem, therefore, is how to change the antitrust 
laws to discourage b ehavior resulting in trivial differences in 
prices and products and to encourage the generation of a wider 
diversity of ideas . In other words, the problea is how to create 
better incentives for dynamic behavior.  
As matters s tand today, the incentives provided by the 
antitrust laws are b etter calculated to minimize risks in the legal 
profession than they are to encourage risk taking in the business 
world. Lawyers feel more at home with legal conspiracy theory 
than they do with economic theory, and they tend to specialize in 
cases for which they are b est prepared. Consequently, when business 
f irms ask their legal counsels in which kind of behavior they can 
engage without risking an antitrus t suit, the normal answer is "Be 
just a little different, but do not collude . "  Providing better 
incentives for competitive b ehavior requires changing the antitrust 
laws so that firms seeking advice on antitrust matters will be told 
the following, ''We know that if you collude, you are in real danger. 
And we also know that the more your products and prices resemble those 
of your competitors, the greater is the danger of an antitrust suit. 
But we cannot tell you how far you can go with respect to parallel 
behavior. Jus t as Presidents have to operate within a broad 
band of uncertainty in predicting how far they can go b efore being 
accused of an impeachable offense, so will you have to operate within 
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a broad band of uncertainty . "  
How might the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department 
(or its successor) provide the required incentives: The principal 
criterion for bringing antitrust cases would relate to both the 
performance of an industry and the conduct of firms within that 
industry . Suppose that over a period of say, 3 years the industry 
exhibits the following performance: a) relatively poor productivity 
gains coupled with b) a diminishing ability to engage in international 
competition, which cannot b e  attributed to dumping. And further 
suppose that the b ehavior of this industry features only trivial 
differences with respect to prices and products . An industry that 
exhibited such performance.and such b ehavior would be in the same 
danger of having the larges t firms in the industry broken up and 
provided with new managements as would a motorist who exceeded the 
speed limit would b e  of a fine.  However, no attempt would be made 
to precisely define the point at which dissolution of the maj or 
firms in the industry would occur because such a definition would 
provide incentives for minimum acceptable performance . Therefore, 
to maximize the incentive effect it is desireable to leave some 
ambiguity in the laws. 
This is not to say, however, that cases against violators 
would be brought without reference to the consumer . The ultimate 
test of pursuing a diversity of technical appraoches must be in 
terms of potential consumer b enefits . And there are some cases in 
which the generation of a wider divers ity of ideas would provide no 
important consumer b enefits; high fidelity equipment for example .  
On the other hand, i n  a whole numb er of industries a higher degree 
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of dynamic b ehavior, particularly if it resulted in reducing costs, 
could result in important consumer benefits . For example, more 
rivalry in the steel industry easily could lead to a 20 percent 
reduction in costs (measured in real terms ) .  And rivalry in the 
generation of electricity easily could result in costs being no 
more than half of what they otherwise would b e .  
The antitrust laws also should make illegal the practice 
of attempting to maintain standard markups over costs, in poor as 
well as good times . Such practices indicate a high degree of 
insensitivity to feedback and not only contribute to inflation 
but in b eing like the pricing practices employed in the Soviet 
Union are fundamentally incons istent with the preservation of a 
dynamic economic system. Curiously enough, while the Soviets are 
currently introducing incentives to discourage such accounting 
practices, and to encourage dynamic efficiency, we are moving in 
the opposite direction! 
One serious obj ection to tests that leave a good deal 
of amb iguity in the antitrust laws is that such amb iguity will 
provide an open invitation to nonenforcement . Indeed, from the 
point of view of maximizing the probab ility of enforcement, the 
ideal measure of competition would b e  a set of concentration ratios 
that left no more amb iguity than the speed laws; and which could 
s tand as immutable truths for all time to come . However, while 
the ultimate purpose of the antitrust laws is the protection of the 
consumer, what needs to b e  done to b est protect consumer interests 
is constantly changing . For example, when it was ascertained that 
higher energy costs threatened the well-being of the consumers, 
one of the first ques tions that should have b een asked is "Do 
the incentives now employed in the pub lic utility encourage cost 
minimization -- and if not ,  what should b e  done? "  Likewise,  
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ten years ago it should have been appreciated that there was so 
little rivalry in the automob ile and steel industries so as not only 
to j eopardize the interests of consumers , but also the stability 
of firms within those industries . And if cases could not be brought 
against stagnating industries under exis ting laws , the laws should 
have been changed . Moreover , it also must be recognized that in 
one important respect , at leas t ,  economics is like physics : as 
yet , not all the laws are known. Therefore , as more and more and more 
is learned about economic reality, including the role played by 
feedback in promoting economic stability, the laws to promote 
competition will have to be changed so they can incorporate the b est 
economic thinking of the times . 
In order to assure that a greater degree of dynamic 
b ehavior is b rought into the promot ion of competition , there is an 
obvious need to bring a much wider diversity of people into both 
the agencies engaged in bringing antitrust cases ,  and the special 
courts set up to decide such cases . Engineers and other technical 
specialists will b e  needed to distinguish b etween decorative lies , 
and genuine improvements in quality . Because neither lawyers nor 
economists have much experience in risk-taking , successful entre­
preneurs who came from highly rivalrous industries could play an 
important role . For example,  David Packard understands much about 
the workings of competition that is known neither to economists 
nor lawyers . And above all , an agency charged with promoting 
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competition should contain at least a few chemists whose specialty 
is deeply understanding the implications of the second law of thermo­
dynamics . Inasmuch as legal and economic thinking is of the flavor 
of the first law of thermodynamics (in which nothing changes) , such 
thinking is required to insure a reasonable balance of ideas . Thus , 
the principal that diversity contributes to stability -- a principal 
that is the heart of Thomas Jefferson ' s  concept of democracy -- should 
be brought into the agencies bringing and deciding antitrust cases . 
There are, of cours e ,  a few old-fashioned Blackstone 
lawyers who can be counted upon to resist these changes . Fortunately , 
however, the legal profess ion contains a wide diversity of people 
and it is hoped that at least a few of them will recognize what 
is at stake . 
Finally , to anticipate one question that is often asked : 
Why try to save stagnant industries -- why not let foreign competition 
drive firms in such industries out of business?  Part of the answer 
is that such a policy would result in a very serious rise in chronic 
long-term unemployment . When industries are highly rivalrous , some 
firms will experience "prosperity" while others are experiencing 
"recession , "  which means that while there will b e  unemployment in 
such industries , it is short-term frictional unemployment .  Moreover , 
more often than no t ,  total employment opportunities in a highly 
rivalrous industry like computers or semi-conductors will b e  
expanding . On the other hand , when workers in the steel industry 
are unemployed by foreign competition, this results in entire 
communities being faced with chronic unemployment problems . 
The other part of the answer is that the American public 
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will not long tolerate such unemployment . Indeed , it can b e  
predicted that within relatively few years there will be a clamor for 
protectionism such as occurred during the 1930s -- and that as we 
move towards a greater degree of protectionism so will other countries . 
It is to avert such a catastrophe that an entirely new 
approach must be adopted for the promotion of competition. 
